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Abstract: Using secondary market data on corporate bonds issued in Japan between 1997 
and 2005, this paper explores the determinants of the credit spread of corporate bond 
rates over interest swap rates.  We find that credit spreads properly reflect financial 
factors at the firm level, including debt-to-equity ratios, volatility, and maturity, 
particularly for longer-term bonds.  In addition, an economy-wide factor common among 
bond issues unable to be captured by firm-level factors, plays an important role in 
determining credit spreads, and these economy-wide effects to a great extent cancel out 
firm-level factors for some subsample periods.  We also identify possible factors 
responsible for the significant economy-wide effects. 
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1. Introduction 
Using secondary market data on corporate bonds issued in Japan between 1997 and 2005, 
this paper empirically investigates the possible determinants of credit spreads on 
corporate bonds, including financial factors summarized at the level of individual firms as 
well as macroeconomic and market-wide effects. 
According to standard frameworks for bond pricing models, including Merton (1974), 
credit risks mainly reflect firm-level financial factors responsible for the possibility of 
individual default, while interest rate risks are only determined by market-wide factors 
common among individual firms.  Typically, these include macroeconomic conditions 
and monetary policies.  One of the more important implications of this model is that firm-
specific and macroeconomic factors responsible for the determination of credit spreads 
may be summarized by variables at the individual firm level.  The risk-free rate is the 
only macroeconomic variable that appears in the standard model.  Given this 
conventional prediction, as long as the set of firm-level explanatory variables is properly 
chosen to reflect both the firm-specific and macroeconomic components, the credit 
spreads of corporate bond rates over market interest rates can be explained mostly by 
firm-level financial conditions.  These include debt-to-equity ratios and the volatility of 
corporate value, along with individual contract clauses, such as maturity and any attached 
options.  In other words, there is little room for credit spreads to be influenced by market-
wide effects (except for the risk-free rate) beyond what is captured by these firm-level 
financial variables and contract clauses. 
We carefully and rigorously assess the empirical relevance of the above prediction by 
raising the following questions: namely, (i) whether credit spreads on corporate bonds 
reflect firm-level financial factors in a proper way; (ii) whether there are market-wide 
effects other than firm-level factors; and (iii) if the answer to the second question is in the 
affirmative, what macroeconomic conditions are responsible for market-wide factors. 
Our empirical investigation is motivated mainly by the following observation 
concerning Japanese corporate bond markets.  One of the clear and simple predictions 
available from standard pricing models of credit risk is the negative correlation between 
credit spreads and equity prices, which serves as a proxy for corporate valuation.  That is, 
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a decrease in equity prices will enhance default risk and thereby raise credit spreads on 
corporate bonds.  Figure 1 plots the relation between the average credit spreads on 
Moody’s A-rated corporate bonds and the average total equity valuation of the issuing 
firms.  As shown, there is indeed a negative correlation between credit spreads and equity 
valuations for both the period between 1997 and 2002, and the period between 2003 and 
2005.  Between 2002 and 2003, however, credit spreads declined substantially although 
equity valuations also fell heavily.  The positive correlation in these subsample periods is 
uniformly observed for highly rated corporate bonds with different maturities (from less 
than three years to longer than 10 years).  Among low-grade corporate bonds, such as Baa 
rated issues, a positive correlation between credit spreads and equity valuation is again 
observed for the period between 2001 and 2003 (see Figure 2).  In addition, a positive 
correlation between the two is observed between 1997 and 1999.  Credit spreads 
increased while equity valuation was relatively strong.  Such overall consistency and 
particular inconsistency in the relationship between credit spreads and corporate 
valuation may help to separate independent market-wide effects on credit spreads from 
firm-specific factors. 
The motivation of this paper is shared with existing empirical literature on U.S. 
corporate bond pricing.  Among empirical papers based on corporate bonds issued in the 
U.S., Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin (2001), and Delianedis and Geske (2001) 
divided the determinants of credit spreads into market-wide factors and firm-level factors.  
Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) found that firm-level financial factors, including leverage 
ratios and equity valuation, play little part in determining credit spreads and that credit 
spreads are largely subject to market-wide factors possibly associated with overall market 
liquidity.  Delianedis and Geske (2001) established that firm-level financial factors, 
including the volatility of corporate value, did not contribute to the determination of 
credit spreads on corporate bonds and that individual credit spreads were heavily 
influenced by market risks measured in terms of the returns and volatilities of equity 
market indexes.  In addition, Jones, Mason and Rosenfeld (1984) and Huang and Huang 
(2003) demonstrated that firm-level financial factors do not contribute to corporate bond 
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pricing. 1
In terms of empirical studies concerning corporate bonds issued in Japan, Ueki (1999), 
Ieda and Ohba (1998) and Ieda (2001) examined the possible determinants of credit 
spreads, claiming that firm-specific factors are mainly responsible for the determination 
of credit spreads.
  Together, these papers suggest that the determination of credit spreads is 
seriously inconsistent with standard bond pricing theory; in fact, these empirical results 
act partly as a trigger for the theoretical development of more general models. 
2
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 reviews the empirical 
predictions based on the standard credit risk model.  Sections 3 and 4 present empirical 
  However, the fundamental difference from the work based on U.S. 
corporate bonds and our analysis is that they investigated the relationship between credit 
spreads and credit ratings, and were unconcerned with the possible effects of the firm-
level financial factors underlying these ratings. 
Our major findings are summarized as follows.  First, credit spreads properly reflect 
firm-level financial factors, including equity valuation and the volatility of corporate 
value, particularly for corporate bonds with maturities in excess of 10 years.  Second, 
economy-wide effects also play an important role in determining credit spreads.  For the 
period between 1997 and 1999, and again between 2001 and 2003, an economy-wide 
effect dominated and cancelled out the effects dictated by the firm-level financial 
conditions, thereby yielding a positive correlation between credit spreads and equity 
valuation at the aggregate level.  Third, further empirical investigation into market-wide 
effects demonstrates that the overall deterioration of corporate bond market liquidity 
during a financial crisis contributed to a significantly positive market-wide effect on 
credit spreads from 1997 through 1999.  Moreover, massive capital inflows into corporate 
bond markets because of aggressive monetary policy generated a significant aggregate 
impact between 2001 and 2003. 
                                                 
1 As a possible exception to the findings of these papers, Longstaff, Mithal and Neil (2005) used the 
premiums on credit default swaps (CDS) to identify the possible determinants of credit spreads on 
corporate bonds.  They found that credit spreads are largely determined by those firm-specific factors 
associated with credit risk and liquidity premiums. 
2 Takaoka and McKenzie (2006) amongst others empirically investigate the mechanism determining 
credit spreads in new issues markets, but not secondary markets, in Japan. 
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specifications and estimation results for firm-level (or issue-specific) effects and market-
wide effects, respectively.  Section 5 offers some conclusions. 
2. Determinants of credit spreads on corporate bonds 
This section briefly reviews a standard model of credit spreads on corporate bonds, 
thereby lending theoretical support to our empirical specification.  More specifically, we 
base our theoretical foundations on work undertaken by Merton (1974).  One basic idea 
in Merton (1974) is that a default option assigned to stockholders is also a put option 
issued by bondholders to stockholders.  While the assumptions presented by Merton 
(1974) are simple, they provide a convenient basis for identifying the effects of firm-level 
factors and market-wide effects on the credit spread.  In this regard, Merton (1974) can 
act as a diagnostic model; that is, if some implications from Merton (1974) are rejected, 
then the standard framework may need to be modified, and other factors may have to be 
seriously considered.  As discussed briefly in the introduction and in more detail later, 
frequent rejection of the standard predictions from Merton (1974) using a database of U.S. 
corporate bond markets acts as a trigger for further theoretical extension and sheds light 
on the importance of other potential factors, such as market liquidity. 
To implement Merton’s (1974) model, we make the following simplifying 
assumptions.  First, the term structure of credit risk-free interest rates (market interest 
rates) is exogenously fixed.  Second, in addition to equities, firms issue only straight 
corporate bonds.  Third, the corporate bonds considered are pure discount securities.  In 
other words, bond coupons are ignored.  Fourth, a corporate bond does not carry any 
options, such as conversion or warrants.  Fifth, the volatility of returns on corporate value 
is assumed to be constant over time.  Finally, a firm triggers a default option when bond 
repayment obligations at maturity (corporate liabilities) exceed corporate valuation.  In 
other words, an exercise price in terms of corporate valuation is exactly equal to the 
bonds outstanding. 
As mentioned earlier, following the frequent rejection of a standard version of Merton 
(1974) using U.S. corporate bond market data, the existing literature has relaxed several 
of these simplifying assumptions in an important way.  For example, in Longstaff and 
Schwartz (1995), a stochastic process of instantaneous risk-free rates determines the term 
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structure of risk-free interest rates endogenously.  Alternatively, Hull et al. (2005) and 
Gatfaoui (2006) assumed the time-varying volatilities of returns on corporate bonds, and 
Black and Cox (1976) consider the case where a default option is triggered before 
maturity.  Finally, Leland (1994), Leland and Toft (1996), and Mella-Barral and 
Perraudin (1997) analyze situations where a trigger point (the exercise price) is 
determined endogenously because of the strategic interaction between firms and 
bondholders. 
Suppose that a firm issues a straight discount bond at time t  whose outstanding 
amount TK  matures at time T .  The corresponding risk-free interest rate for the 
( )t tT T T t= −  term is equal to tr .  If this bond is completely free of default risk, then its 
price is equal to the discounted value of TK  ( exp( )T t tK r T− ⋅ ).  Therefore, an essential 
consideration in corporate bond pricing is how much a straight corporate bond is further 
discounted in the presence of credit risk. 
As discussed, Merton (1974) interpreted the issuance of a discount bond with a default 
option as the case where bondholders sell stockholders a European put option on 
corporate valuation ( tV ) at time T , whose exercise price is equal to TK  (repayment 
obligations).  Consequently, corporate bond pricing tB  is discounted from 
exp( )T t tK r T− ⋅  by the corresponding value of this put option. 
Merton (1974) applied the Black–Scholes–Merton formula (Black and Scholes, 1973; 
Merton, 1973) to the pricing of the put option issued to stockholders by bondholders and 
derived the corporate bond pricing ( tB ) as follows: 
( ) exp( ) ( )t t t T t t t t tB V N z K r T N z Tσ= ⋅ − + ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ − , 
where 
2
log
2
t t
t t
T
t
t t
V r T
K
z
T
σ
σ
   
+ + ⋅   
  =
.  
In this derivation, tσ denotes the volatility of 
returns on corporate valuation tV .  ( )N x  is the standard normal cumulative distribution 
function at x , and log implies a natural logarithmic operator. 
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The annual yield on the corporate bond ty  is defined as: 
1 log tt
t T
By
T K
= − ⋅
, 
and the credit spread ( t t tspread y r= − ) is derived as: 
1 log ( ) ( )
exp( )
t
t t t t t
t T t t
Vspread N z N z T
T K r T
σ
 
= − ⋅ ⋅ − + − ⋅ − ⋅ 
. (1) 
Equation (1) demonstrates that credit spreads are determined by a single market factor 
represented by the risk-free interest rate tr , and three firm-level or issue-specific factors: 
(i) the corporate leverage ratio defined by exp( )T t t tK r T V⋅ − ⋅  (we refer to this as the 
present value of the leverage ratio in the sense that bond repayments are evaluated in 
terms of present value); (ii) the volatility of the returns on the corporate valuation tσ ; and 
(iii) the remaining terms to maturity tT . 
In terms of firm-level factors, credit spreads increase with leverage ratios.  This 
immediately implies that credit spreads are decreasing in corporate valuation or equity 
valuation.  With higher leverage ratios, the probabilities of default are higher, and the 
corresponding credit risks become larger.  An increase in corporate volatility tσ  raises 
the value of the put option (default option) issued to stockholders by bondholders, 
thereby lowering corporate bond pricing and enhancing credit spreads.  On the other hand, 
the effect of maturity tT  on credit spreads may not be monotonic.  As pointed out by 
Merton (1974) and Leland and Toft (1996), credit spreads depend on the interaction 
between maturity tT  and firm-level factors, such as leverage ratios and corporate 
volatility, in a complicated way. 
In addition to these firm-level and issue-specific effects, the pattern of coupons on 
corporate bonds has potential effects on credit spreads.3
                                                 
3 Geske (1977) considered explicitly the effect of coupons on corporate bonds, and considered not 
only redemption at maturity, but also coupon payments up to maturity, as being subject to credit risk.  
  Like other individual factors, for 
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example, market liquidity may be associated with a particular issue of corporate bonds.  
As discussed in our empirical specification, firm-level and issue-specific factors other 
than leverage ratios (or equity valuation), corporate volatility, and maturity are treated as 
individual effects, such as fixed effects or random effects, in the context of panel data 
analysis. 
One of the most important aspects concerning equation (1) is that the firm-specific and 
macroeconomic factors responsible for the determination of credit spreads can be 
basically captured by firm-level and issue-specific variables, such as leverage ratios, 
corporate volatilities, and maturity.  While risk-free interest rates of corresponding 
maturities may serve as a macroeconomic factor, the effect of changes in risk-free interest 
rates tr  is only indirect to the extent that the present value version of a leverage 
ratio exp( )T t t tK r T V⋅ − ⋅  declines with tr .  It is easy to prove that there is no effect of 
changes in tr  on credit spreads through tz
 
(
2
log
2
t t
t t
T
t
t t
V r T
K
z
T
σ
σ
   
+ + ⋅   
  = ). 
Given the marginal negative effect of tr , so long as the estimated common factors 
synchronize negatively with the corresponding market interest rates over time, the 
presence of common factors may be consistent with the underlying structural model.  On 
the other hand, if the time-series pattern of common factors is quite different from that of 
market interest rates, then there may be other types of time-varying economy-wide effects 
unable to be captured by the structural model.  Candidates for such common effects 
include improvement or deterioration in the overall market liquidity of corporate bonds, 
and dynamic changes in capital flows into corporate bond markets induced by 
macroeconomic policies, particularly monetary policy. 
3. Empirical specification and estimation results for firm-level effects 
This section explores the firm-level and issue-specific effects on credit spreads, while the 
following section investigates the market-wide effects on credit spreads.  The first and 
                                                                                                                                                 
However, Geske’s (1977) specification is highly nonlinear, and does not fit simple empirical 
specification.   
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second subsections examine empirically the reduced-form implications available from 
equation (1). 
3.1 The relationships between credit spreads and firm-level factors 
3.1.1 Econometric specification 
This subsection adopts an econometric specification for the level of credit spreads based 
on equation (1).  As expressed in specification (2), we consider the following as firm-
level or issue-specific determinants of the credit spreads on corporate bonds: market-
evaluated debt-to-equity ratios (with logarithmic transformation itderatio ), the volatility 
of returns on corporate valuation ( itσ ), and the remaining years to maturity (its 
logarithmic transformation itT ), as well as the risk-free rates of corresponding maturities 
( tr ) and quarterly time dummy variables ( ttime ) as market-wide effects. 
2004Q.4
1997Q.2
( ) log( ) ( ) ( ) ( )i i i i it t t t t t t t
t
spread intercept deratio T r timeα β σ γ θ λ ε
=
= + + + + + +∑
 (2) 
As equation (1) implies, credit spreads increase with debt-to-equity ratios (positive α ) 
and corporate volatility (positive β ).  As discussed, however, the sign of the coefficients 
on maturity may be ambiguous within a standard framework.  As in specification (2), we 
add risk-free rates and quarterly time dummies to capture the market-wide effects on 
credit spreads.  In Section 4, we discuss in detail the pattern of estimated coefficients on 
these time dummies, and identify potential factors responsible for the market-wide effects. 
3.1.2 Data construction 
The dependent and explanatory variables are defined as follows.  The credit spread 
( itspread ) is the spread of a yield on corporate bond i over an interest rate swap rate of 
the same maturity.4
                                                 
4 The corresponding interest rate swap rate is computed from the term structure of the daily average of mid-
points of offer and bid rates quoted by Yagi Euro (a major market-maker) using a linear interpolation 
method. 
  A major reason for using swap rates instead of yields on government 
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bonds as reference safe rates is that yields on Japanese government bonds (JGB) earn a 
form of convenience, and it is difficult to control for effects of convenience on interest 
rates. 5
The variables representing the debt-to-equity ratios and corporate volatility are 
constructed as follows.  The logarithmic transformation of the debt-to-equity ratio of a 
firm that issues corporate bond 
  Nevertheless, the choice between swap rates and JGB rates does not affect the 
overall estimation results.  
     For yields on corporate bonds, we use the dataset released by Nomura Research 
Institute (NRI).  NRI constructs the dataset by compiling the daily average of mid-points 
of bid and ask prices that are reported by The Japan Securities Dealers Association.  NRI 
compiles these prices for the above dataset.   
i  is defined as log
i
t
i
t
debt
equity
 
 
 
, where itdebt  is the 
total book value of long-term debts (comprising long-term loans, straight bonds, 
convertible bonds, and warrant bonds), and itequity  is the market valuation of equities 
defined as the product of the stock price per issue and the number of stock issues.  To 
compute the daily outstanding long-term debt, we linearly interpolate loans and debts 
outstanding from the semiannual or quarterly balance sheets.  For this purpose, we use 
financial statements compiled by NRI.  To compute the equity valuation, we use the 
dataset compiled by NRI for both stock prices and the number of stock issues.6
i
tV
 
We estimate the conditional volatility of returns on corporate value  
( i it tequity debt= + ) with the following steps.  First, we estimate a GARCH(1,1) 
specification for daily returns on equity valuation 1log( ) log( )t t tret equity equity −= −  and 
obtain daily conditional volatility as: 
2 2 2
1 1 1( | ) - ( ) ( - )t t t t tV ret ret eq intercept ret eqσ α β σ− − −= = + + . 
                                                 
5 More concretely, as Fukuta, Saito, and Takagi (2002) show, JGB yields were severely subject to 
differences in issue-specific convenience, mainly driven by the degree of the cheapest to deliver (CTD) in 
the JGB futures market in both the late 1990s and the first half of the 2000s, including our sample period.  
During that period, the first and second CTD issues were priced extremely highly relative to those with a 
similar fundamental, and it is quite difficult to derive a unique term structure for JGB markets. 
6 More precisely, the number of stock issues used in this analysis is adjusted according to the TOPIX-
type computation. 
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The estimated daily volatility is then expressed at annual rates by 2- 240teq σ × , where 
one year amounts to 240 business days.  Finally, we translate the estimated volatility on 
equity valuation into the conditional volatility on corporate valuation using:7
( )
2
2 2
t- 240 tt
t
equityeq
V
σ σ
 
= × × 
 
 
. 
Following the above procedure, we estimate the conditional volatility of the corporate 
valuation for our sample.8
219
191-
20 1 20
t
t
ii t
t i
i t
ret
eq retσ
−
−
=
=
 
 = × −
 −  
∑∑
 
     To examine the robustness of the estimation based on the above GARCH 
characterization, we also use as an alternative specification the following historical 
volatility using the equity returns of the past twenty business days: 
 
. 
 
In terms of market-wide effects, the interest swap rate with a corresponding maturity 
to the corporate bond is chosen as the risk-free rate ( tr ).  With the first quarter of 2005 as 
a reference point, a quarterly time dummy ( ttime ) is constructed from the second quarter 
of 1997 through to the fourth quarter of 2004. 
The full sample period is between April 1, 1997 and January 31, 2005.  During this 
time, Moody’s rated 2,658 public issues of straight corporate bonds in Japan.  We 
                                                 
7 We implicitly assume that the default probability is rather low given that our sample consists of 
listed large corporations.  As shown by Campbell and Taksler (2003), Schönbucher (2003) and Lando 
(2004), if the probability of default is relatively high, it is necessary to correct these probabilities using 
( )- Vteq Call Vtt t equityt
σ σ
 
′= ⋅ ⋅   
 
 where ( )Call Vt  denotes the price of a call option.  In our computation, 
we implicitly assume ( ) 1Call Vt′ = . 
8 As Pagan (1984) and Pagan and Ullah (1988) demonstrate, as long as 2( )itσ  is estimated using a 
proper specification, the coefficients on the estimated second moments 2( )itσ  are consistent.  It is 
possible to prove that this consistency also holds for the coefficients on log( )itσ . 
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exclude bonds issued by merged or merging companies, most of which were financial 
institutions, because it is difficult to compute a precise corporate value for these types of 
firms.  Consequently, our sample consists of 2,305 corporate bonds issued by 174 firms. 
We estimate equation (2) and other specifications presented later for the full sample 
and subsample periods, by rating, and by maturity.  Concerning the rating classification, 
we refer to a rating of Baa or higher as investment grade, and a rating of Ba or lower as 
speculative grade.9
3.1.3 Estimation results 
  In addition, we estimate equation (2) for Aaa, Aa, A, and Baa bond 
issues.  We also divide the sample of bonds into those with short-term maturities (shorter 
than three years), middle-term maturities (between three years and seven years), long-
term maturities (between seven and 10 years), and ultralong-term maturities (10 years and 
over). 
Tables 1 and 2 provide the estimation results of specification (2) for the GARCH-based 
volatility and the historical volatility respectively.  Considering the simultaneous 
determination of both the credit spreads and the debt-to-equity ratios, the current debt-to-
equity ratio is instrumented by the other explanatory variables as well as by the one-day 
and two-day lagged debt-to-equity ratios, although no substantial difference is found 
between the estimation results using OLS and the instrumental variables estimators.10
                                                 
9 The yields or credit spreads on speculative grades are missing for the period between August 5, 2002, 
and September 20, 2002, because low-grade corporate bonds are rather illiquid and their bid/ask prices 
were not quoted by corporate bond dealers.  Hence, the estimation for speculative grade bonds 
excludes this sample period.   
10 We conduct the Sargan test to check the validity of a set of instrument variables including one-day and 
two-day lagged debt-to-equity ratios.  The null-hypothesis that all instrument variables are exogenous is not 
rejected at the 5% significance level for the individual rating groups (those consisting of identically rated 
bonds) except for Baa for a middle term, while the null is sometimes rejected for the semi-aggregated rating 
groups such as investment/speculative grade bonds.  
  
Throughout this paper, and following Arellano (1987), we compute robust standard 
deviations with respect to cross-sectional heteroskedasticity and serial correlation within 
the same issue.  Because the random effects model is rejected against the fixed effects 
model according to the Wu–Hausman test, we report only those estimation results based 
on the latter. 
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As shown in Table 1, and consistent with the theoretical predictions, the estimated 
coefficients of the debt-to-equity ratios are significantly positive in many cases using the 
full sample period.  However, for short-term highly rated bonds (such as Aaa and Aa), the 
estimated coefficients are significantly negative.  This contradicts the theoretical 
predictions.11
As discussed in the introduction, a positive relationship between equity valuation and 
credit spreads is observed at the aggregate level between 1997 and 1999, and again from 
2001 to 2003.  To examine the consistency of the firm-level effects for these periods, we 
estimate equation (2) using the subsample between April 1997 and January 1999, and 
between October 2001 and December 2002.
 
12
According to Table 2, the estimation based on the historical volatility also yields 
theoretically consistent results in most cases.  In addition, the estimated positive 
coefficients on the volatility are more significant in the historical volatility than in the 
GARCH-based volatility.  However, the estimation using the historical volatility reverses 
  The coefficients on the debt-to-equity 
ratios are significantly positive in most cases.  These results clearly demonstrate that 
firm-level financial factors were not responsible for the positive correlation between 
credit spreads and equity valuation observed at the aggregate level for these particular 
subsamples. 
As shown in Table 1, the full sample period estimation of the coefficients for the 
GARCH-based volatility is theoretical consistent in most cases, although there are some 
mixed results.  For both investment grade bonds (Baa or higher) and speculative grade 
bonds (Ba or lower), the estimated coefficients are significantly positive for all terms of 
maturity.  Given more detailed classification among the investment grades, however, the 
estimated coefficients are negative in Aa for a long-term, A for a short-term, and Baa for 
middle and ultra-long terms.   
                                                 
11 Such theoretically inconsistent results are observed in not only our estimation on Japanese corporate 
bonds, but also several papers on US corporate bonds, including Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001), Bedendo et 
al. (2007), and Bhar and Handzic (2008).  Those papers do not offer any convincing explanation for this 
puzzling result either.  While we conjecture that such a result may be driven by missing variables in a linear 
specification, or non-linearity associated with debt-to-equity ratios, we would like to leave this issue to a 
future research agenda. 
12 The estimation results for the subsample periods are available upon request. 
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the theoretically consistent results of the GARCH-based estimation in Aaa for middle and 
ultra-long terms, and Aa for an ultra-long term. 
In terms of maturity effects for investment grade bonds, the coefficients tend to be 
negative for short and ultralong-term bonds, and positive for middle- and long-term 
bonds.  This indicates that the term structure of credit spreads is nonlinear.  With respect 
to market-wide effects, and as theoretically expected, credit spreads decrease with swap 
rates in most cases. 13
3.2 The relationship between changes in credit spreads and changes in equity 
valuation 
  However, a positive effect of changes in swap rates on credit 
spreads is observed for middle-, long-, and ultralong-term investment grade bonds for the 
period between October 2001 and December 2002.  Section 4 discusses the time series 
pattern of the estimated coefficients using quarterly time dummies. 
3.2.1 Econometric specification and data construction 
Following the empirical investigation on U.S. corporate bonds, including work by Collin-
Dufresne et al. (2001), this subsection examines some implications for changes in, not 
levels of, credit spreads as driven by the firm-level and issue-specific financial conditions 
in equation (1).  That is, a decrease in leverage ratios leads to a decrease in credit spreads.  
In terms of high-frequency movements, most of the changes in leverage ratios come from 
changes in the market valuation of equities, with an improvement (deterioration) in equity 
valuation resulting in a decrease (increase) in the leverage ratios.  Therefore, credit 
spreads should decrease with equity valuation. 
We assume that the other factors possibly responsible for changes in credit spreads 
may be accounted for by changes in the credit rating of a corresponding interval as firm-
level effects and by changes in risk-free rates as macroeconomic effects.  While we 
estimate several intervals for changes in credit spreads, from one day through to one 
quarter, the estimation results do not depend on the choice of time interval.  Thus, we 
                                                 
13 In the extant work on U.S. corporate bond markets, Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) and Duffee 
(1998) used Treasury rates to proxy as the risk-free rate for corporate bonds issued in the U.S., and 
found a significant, albeit weak, negative correlation between credit spreads and the risk-free rate. 
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only report those estimation results based on a one-month interval or 20-business-day 
changes. 
The preceding argument can be captured by the following specification: 
20 ,
2004Q.4
20
1997Q.2
( ) ( - )
( ) ( )
i i i i
t t t j t j
j
i
t t t t t
t
spread spread intercept ret Rating change
r r time
α β
λ γ ε
−
−
=
− = + +
+ − + +
∑
∑　　　　　　　　　 
, (3) 
where itspread  is the credit spread of issue i , 
i
tret  is the 20-business-day change 
(between time t and time t – 20) in equity valuation of a company issuing corporate bond 
i, and ,-
i
t jRating change  is a dummy variable associated with a j notch change in the 
credit rating for the corresponding period.  In addition to these firm-level variables, we 
include the 20-business-day change in the risk-free interest rate ( 20t tr r −− ) and a quarterly 
time dummy ( ttime ) as economy-wide effects, 
The 20-business-day change in the market valuation of equities of a company issuing 
corporate bond i  is computed by 20log( ) log( )
i i i
t t tret equity equity −= − .  A dummy variable 
with respect to each change in credit rating of issue i for 20 business days 
( ,-
i
t jRating change ) is based on a rating by Moody’s, whose rating information is 
compiled by IN Information Data Service.  We index the Moody’s rating into 20 (the 
highest rating) through 1 (the lowest rating), compute the numerical change in the 
indexed rating, and construct a dummy variable for each value of the numerical change in 
rating.  A deterioration in ratings ranges between 11j = −  and 1j = − , and an 
improvement in rating ranges from 1j = +  to 3j = + .  Because no change in rating 
( 0j = ) serves as the reference category, a dummy variable for no change is excluded 
from the list of explanatory variables. 
In terms of market-wide effects, the interest-rate swap rate of the corresponding 
maturity of a corporate bond is chosen as the risk-free rate ( tr ).  With the first quarter of 
2005 as the reference category, a quarterly time dummy ( ttime ) is constructed from the 
second quarter of 1997 through to the fourth quarter of 2004. 
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3.2.2 Estimation results 
Tables 3 and 4 report the estimation results of equation (3) for the full sample period.  
Because, as in Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001), we are mainly interested in the effects of 
unpredicted movements in equity valuation, we employ an OLS estimator.  Following 
Arellano (1987), we again compute robust standard deviations with respect to cross-
sectional heteroskedasticity and serial correlation within the same issue.  While most of 
the issue-specific fixed effects may be removed by the time differences in credit spreads, 
we still consider issue-specific effects in the estimation.  According to the Wu–Hausman 
test, the random effects model is again rejected against the fixed effects model. 
As shown in Table 3, consistent with the reduced-form implications from equation (1), 
the estimated coefficients on changes in equity valuation are significantly negative in all 
cases.  That is, an increase in leverage ratios through equity devaluation tends to result in 
larger credit spreads.  These results demonstrate that credit spreads reflect firm level 
factors, more specifically, individual default possibilities, at least in a qualitatively 
consistent manner. 
Table 4 reports the estimated coefficients on the changes in rating.  As demonstrated 
in Table 4, credit spreads decline with rate improvement and increase with rate 
deterioration during the full sample period. 
As discussed before, a positive relationship between equity valuation and credit 
spreads, sharply inconsistent with any theoretical prediction, is observed at the aggregate 
level between 1997 and 1999 and between 2001 and 2003.  The coefficients on changes 
in equity valuation are significantly negative in all cases between 1997 and 1999.14
                                                 
14 The estimation results for the subsample periods are available upon request. 
  On 
the other hand, the coefficients on changes in equity valuation are significantly negative 
in all cases between 2001 and 2002.  These findings clearly demonstrate that firm-level 
financial factors were not responsible for the positive correlation between credit spreads 
and equity valuation observed at the aggregate level for these particular subsamples. 
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As theoretically expected, an increase in swap rates results in a decrease in credit 
spreads in most cases.  However, a positive effect of changes in swap rates on credit 
spreads is observed among middle- and long-term corporate bonds for the period between 
October 2001 and November 2002. 15
4. Empirical specifications and estimation results for the market-wide effects 
  Section 4 discusses the time series pattern in 
effects other than the risk-free rate. 
In contrast with the estimation results of Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001), our estimated 
coefficients on changes in equity valuation are significantly negative.  In our sample of 
corporate bonds issued in Japan, credit spreads tended to reflect firm-level default 
possibilities in a qualitatively consistent manner. 
This section investigates how market-wide effects on credit spreads behave, and which 
factors are responsible for the dynamic changes in market-wide effects. 16
tλ
  We first 
explore the properties of the time series pattern of market-wide effects ( ) in equation 
(2).  We also discuss some market episodes likely to be associated with the time series 
pattern in order to understand the possible driving forces responsible for these effects.  
We then attempt to identify several particular factors that drive the market-wide 
dynamics in individual credit spreads. 
4.1 Time-series patterns in market-wide effects and some market episodes 
Figure 3 plots the time series of estimated coefficients on quarterly time dummies with 
95% confidence bounds for short-term, middle-term, long-term, and ultralong-term 
investment grades (Baa or higher), while Figure 4 constructs these for short-term, middle-
term, and long-term speculative grades (Ba or lower).  In both of these figures, the first 
quarter of 2005 serves as the reference point for measuring the time effects. 
                                                 
15 Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) did not observe the positive effect of risk-free rates on credit spreads 
and Duffee (1998) in their study of the relationship between credit spreads and risk-free rates for 
bonds issued in the U.S. 
16 Anderson and Sundaresan (2000) adopted an alternative method to identify market-wide effects on 
credit spreads.  Using the average debt-to-equity ratio for the entire nonfinancial sector and the 
volatility of stock market indexes, they found that these variables could explain yields on BBB-rated 
corporate bonds in the U.S. 
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As Figures 3 through 4 clearly demonstrate, market-wide effects contributed to an 
expansion of credit spreads between early 1997 and late 1998.  As discussed in the 
introduction, corporate bonds rated as Baa (Figure 2) yielded increases in credit spreads 
with rises in stock prices for that period.  Given the qualitatively reasonable estimation 
for firm-level effects, it follows that market-wide effects largely cancelled out the 
decreases in credit spreads induced by firm-level equity valuation. 
We have two remarks concerning the above period.  First, the ‘flight to quality’ 
phenomenon emerged during the financial crisis in 1997 and 1998.  That is, funds shifted 
from relatively risky markets (such as corporate bond markets) to relatively safe markets 
(such as JGB markets or money markets).  In addition to such a decrease in demand for 
corporate bonds, the increase in new corporate bonds issues as a supply factor contributed 
to a rise of corporate bond yields, thereby raising credit spreads. 
Second, two companies that issued corporate bonds went bankrupt.  Yaohan (a 
nationwide supermarket chain) and Nihon Kokudo Kaihatsu (a large-scale general 
contractor) became insolvent in 1997.  Contrary to earlier custom, their main banks never 
bought back the outstanding corporate bonds at face value.  Consequently, the corporate 
bonds issued by these companies were in default.  As a result, many investors, 
particularly institutional investors, revised credit spreads upwards.  Conversely, market-
wide effects have contributed to continuous declines in credit spreads since early 1999.  
The flight to quality phenomenon, which had been responsible for market-wide increases 
in credit spreads, disappeared after public injections into private banks in early 1999.  
Because of a zero-interest policy initiated in February 1999, and a quantity-easing policy 
implemented in March 2001, rich funds held by public and private financial institutions 
began to flow into corporate bond markets in search of relatively profitable investment 
opportunities; outstanding corporate bonds held by public and private financial 
institutions increased continuously and substantially from 1999.17
                                                 
17 Baba, Nakashima, Shigemi and Ueda (2006) investigate the issuance rates of negotiable certificates 
of deposit (NCD).  They demonstrate that improvement in the credit conditions of issuing banks could 
not fully account for the decline in NCD rates after 1999.  They suggest instead that the aggressive 
monetary policy pursued by the Bank of Japan was partially responsible for negative market-wide 
effects on NCD rates.  
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This flow into Japanese corporate bond markets was temporarily terminated by the 
bankruptcy of MyCal (a large supermarket chain) in September 2001.  As a result, all 27 
corporate bonds issues issued by MyCal were in default.  At the same time, investors 
again revised credit spreads upwards, particularly for middle-, long-, and ultralong-term 
investment grades, and speculative grades. 18
4.2 Quantitative assessment of driving forces responsible for market-wide effects 
  However, credit spreads on short-term 
investment grades were free from such negative effects and continued to decline. 
However, the effect of the default of MyCal was only temporary.  Public and private 
financial institutions resumed investment in corporate bonds and even in low-grade 
corporate bonds.  As discussed, credit spreads declined for issues overall, although equity 
valuation slumped until late 2003.  That is, a market-wide effect induced by an aggressive 
monetary policy continued to cancel out the increase in credit spreads driven by equity 
devaluation for individual firms during that period. 
In this subsection, we choose five variables to describe changes in market-wide effects, 
and we add these to equation (2) as additional explanatory variables: 
 
2004Q.4
1997Q.2
( ) log( ) ( ) ( )
( ) log( ) log( )
log( ) ( ) ( )
i i i i
t t t t t
t t t
i
t t t t t
t
spread intercept deratio T r
Swap CBv JGBv
HPM DIa time
α β σ γ θ
λ µ ξ
τ ϕ γ ε
=
= + + + +
+ + +
+ + + +∑
, (4) 
where tSwap , tCBv , tJGBv , tHPM , and tDIa  denotes 10-year swap spreads, the 
velocity of corporate bond markets, the velocity of government bond markets, high-
powered money, and the diffusion index of financial positions, respectively.  These 
                                                 
18 The bonds issued by Mycal had been downgraded quickly since the summer of 2001; more concretely, 
from Ba3 to B2 on July 31, 2001, to Caa1 on September 14, 2001, to Caa3 on November 22, 2001, to C in 
November 26, 2001, and no more rating on December 26, 2003.  Such a consecutive downgrading of Mycal 
bonds triggered a serious concern about low-grade corporate bonds, and contributed to a fund shift from 
low-grade to high-grade bonds.  Such anxiety about low-grade corporate bonds might have helped to yield 
the observed difference in market-wide effects between speculative and investment grades during the 
corresponding period. 
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additional explanatory variables are thought to help capture the overall market liquidity 
of corporate bonds.19
More precisely, the first three variables are associated with the market liquidity of 
corporate bonds.  The 10-year swap spread (
 
tSwap ) is the difference in daily 10-year 
rates between government bonds and interest rate swaps.  As discussed in Collin-
Dufresne et al. (2001), swap spreads represent the market liquidity of privately issued 
bonds relative to public bonds; higher swap spreads imply a lower degree of liquidity in 
corporate bond markets. 20
tCBv
  The velocity of corporate and government bond markets 
(  and tJGBv ) is defined as the ratio of the monthly trading volume to the 
outstanding amount in each bond market.  Obviously, a higher velocity suggests an 
improvement in market liquidity. 
We choose high-powered money ( tHPM ) as a monetary factor.  Following Bernanke 
and Mihov (1998), we de-trend the monthly time series of high-powered money based on 
deviation from the three-year moving average.  Finally, we specify the diffusion index 
concerning the current financial positions of large corporations ( tDIa ) as a measure of 
financial need for the corporate sector.  The Bank of Japan constructs the quarterly series 
of the diffusion index by counting firms that consider financial conditions as currently 
improved less those that do not.  Hence, lower values of the diffusion index indicate more 
severe liquidity constraints. 
Using linear interpolation, the daily time series of market velocity are constructed 
from the monthly series of tCBv , tJGBv , and tHPM , and from the quarterly series of 
tDIa .  In addition, we take a logarithm for tCBv , tJGBv , and tHPM .  Table 5 reports the 
                                                 
19 As long as a model of Merton (1974) holds properly, and our linear regression or equation (2) serves as a 
proper specification, any macroeconomic effect works on credit spreads only through the variables listed in 
equation (2), in particular debt-to-equity ratios and interest rates.  Consequently, any additional 
macroeconomic variable does not offer explanatory power for credit spreads under the Merton model.  
Thus, when macroeconomic variables have significant effects on credit spreads, there may be some effect 
other than the credit risk channel captured by the Merton model.  Given this reasoning, we may interpret 
significant effect of macroeconomic variables on credit spreads as not credit premiums, but either 
supply/demand conditions or liquidity premiums. 
20 The Japanese tax code allowed financial institutions to avoid the market valuation of interest-rate 
swap contracts during the sample period.  This special tax treatment promoted active speculation in 
interest-rate swap markets by financial institutions.  Consequently, swap spreads in Japan were 
partially subject to the effect of speculation induced by tax treatment. 
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estimation results of equation (4) for the full sample period (between April 1997 and 
January 2005).  In what follows, we also report estimation results for the two subsample 
periods when a positive correlation between credit spreads and equity valuation is 
observed: the first subperiod between April 1997 and January 1999 and the second 
subperiod between October 2001 and December 2002.21
tSwap
 
As in Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001), the coefficient on swap spreads ( ) is found 
to be significantly positive for the full sample estimation.  That is, when corporate bond 
markets are less liquid than government bond markets (swap spreads are larger), credit 
spreads tend to be larger.  This tendency is more noticeable for bonds with longer 
maturities and for speculative grades.  For the first subperiod between April 1997 and 
January 1999, however, the coefficient on tSwap  is estimated to be negative.  The 
temporary and substantial drop in swap spreads during late 1998 and early 1999 may be 
responsible for the estimated coefficient being negative (see Figure 5). 
The coefficient on the velocity of corporate bond markets ( tCBv ) is estimated to be 
significantly negative for the full sample estimation; credit spreads tend to decrease with 
an increase in corporate bond market liquidity.  The estimated coefficient is larger in 
magnitude for the second subperiod between October 2001 and December 2002 and for 
speculative grade bonds.  This indicates that a remarkable improvement in the overall 
market liquidity of corporate bonds was responsible for a dramatic decline in the credit 
spreads of speculative grades (see Figure 6). 
On the other hand, the coefficient on the velocity of government bond markets 
( tJGBv ) differs in sign between the first and second half of the full sample period.  For 
the first subperiod between 1997 and 1999, the coefficient is significantly positive, while 
it is significantly negative for the second subperiod between 2001 and 2003.  The 
estimation result of the first subperiod provides some evidence of the flight to quality 
(from corporate bond markets to government bond markets).  Figure 6 shows that during 
late 1998 and early 1999, the velocity of corporate bond markets declined, while that of 
government bond markets increased. 
                                                 
21 The estimation results for the subsample periods are available upon request. 
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The coefficient on high-powered money ( tHPM ) is significantly negative in most 
cases.  In particular, the estimated coefficient is larger in absolute terms for short-term 
bonds: with aggressive money supply, short-term private bonds may have been a close 
substitute for credit risk-free bonds (public bonds).  The coefficient on the diffusion index 
of current financial positions ( tDIa ) is estimated to be significantly negative.  That is, 
when liquidity constraints are less binding, credit spreads tend to decrease.  This tendency 
is more noticeable in the second subperiod between 2001 and 2003 and among the 
speculative grades.  That is, together with the overall market liquidity of corporate bond 
markets, improved financial conditions may be responsible for the dramatic and 
substantial decline in the credit spreads of speculative grades. 
As the above results demonstrate, the observed market-wide effects common in 
individual credit spreads reflect not only the market liquidity of corporate bonds but also 
the overall financial condition of the corporate sector.  In addition, credit spreads are 
found to be subject to aggressive monetary policy. 
5. Conclusions 
Using data on corporate bonds issued in Japan between 1997 and 2005, this paper 
considers the possible determinants of the credit spreads of corporate bond rates over 
interest swap rates.  We find that credit spreads reasonably reflect firm-level financial 
factors, including debt-to-equity ratios, volatility, and maturity. 
Overall, the results indicate that firm and issue-specific factors influence credit spreads 
in a quite reasonable manner.  These findings contrast sharply with similar work on U.S. 
corporate bonds where firm level financial conditions were found not to play any 
significant role in determining individual credit spreads.  In this regard, corporate bond 
pricing in the Japanese market is more consistent with a standard version of Merton 
(1974) than the U.S. market. 
On the other hand, an economy-wide factor common among bond issues, as measured 
by time effects, plays an important role in determining credit spreads.  This aspect is 
seriously inconsistent with Merton’s (1974) standard model where macroeconomic 
effects are mostly captured by firm-level variables along with risk-free rates.  That is, the 
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Japanese market shares with the U.S. market the feature that market-wide effects, 
including market liquidity, are significant determinants of credit spreads. 
This common factor had particularly significant effects on the credit spreads observed 
between 1997 and 1998, when financial markets were subject to liquidity crises, and 
between 2001 and 2003, when the Bank of Japan implemented a quantity-easing policy 
with zero overnight money market rates.  During both periods, the economy-wide effect 
largely cancelled out the firm-level factors.  In the earlier period, credit spreads increased 
even though individual stock prices (or equivalently corporate values) were still firm, 
while in the more recent period, credit spreads declined substantially, although equity 
valuation also fell heavily.  Empirical analysis of the more recent period indicates that 
credit risks valuated downwards because of the rich liquidity in corporate bond markets. 
One limitation of our empirical analysis is that we ignore issue-specific or firm-
specific liquidity factors by assuming that liquidity effects are market-wide.  Among 
recent work in this area, Chen, Lesmond, and Wei (2007) demonstrate empirically that 
U.S. credit spreads are subject not only to market-wide liquidity factors but also to issue-
specific liquidity, as measured by the issue-by-issue bid–ask spreads and the frequency of 
individual transactions.  Ericsson and Renault (2006) present theoretically the interaction 
between credit risks and issue-specific liquidity.  We would like to extend our research 
along this line of inquiry. 
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Table 1: Regression of Credit Spreads on Debt-equity Ratios,
GARCH-based Volatilities, Maturities, and Swap Rates
Full Period (April 1, 1997{January 31, 2005)
Maturities
Rating Groups
Independent
Investment-grade
Variables Investment- Speculative-
grade grade
A or Higher Aaa Aa A Baa
Short
deratioit
0.067 1.179 -0.006 -0.580 -0.036 0.006 0.049
(0.002) (0.021) (0.002) (0.092) (0.007) (0.002) (0.003)
log ¾it
0.032 0.352 0.016 0.395 0.032 -0.011 0.005
(0.011) (0.055) (0.016) (0.530) (0.017) (0.007) (0.013)
T it
-0.085 0.101 -0.039 0.079 -0.051 -0.064 -0.133
(0.003) (0.014) (0.003) (0.011) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
rt
-0.144 -0.116 -0.188 -0.235 -0.186 -0.116 -0.104
(0.014) (0.038) (0.022) (0.085) (0.027) (0.012) (0.015)
R-squares (R2) 0.052 0.271 0.029 0.033 0.028 0.204 0.155
the number of issues 1352 396 750 110 422 344 718
Middle
deratioit
0.109 1.149 0.091 0.079 0.007 0.060 0.107
(0.001) (0.016) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
log ¾it
0.105 0.115 0.007 0.035 0.001 0.010 -0.005
(0.008) (0.028) (0.005) (0.015) (0.003) (0.006) (0.008)
T it
0.309 1.829 0.066 0.003 0.038 0.206 0.478
(0.007) (0.120) (0.005) (0.009) (0.003) (0.009) (0.012)
rt
-0.046 -0.122 -0.040 -0.003 -0.052 -0.055 -0.053
(0.002) (0.019) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
R-squares (R2) 0.454 0.430 0.651 0.805 0.819 0.744 0.542
the number of issues 1472 351 846 97 403 448 774
Long
deratioit
0.109 0.400 0.048 0.067 0.009 0.042 0.045
(0.002) (0.011) (0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
log ¾it
0.024 0.091 0.001 0.151 -0.005 0.014 0.003
(0.009) (0.031) (0.005) (0.019) (0.003) (0.007) (0.015)
T it
0.701 1.762 0.657 0.832 0.540 0.736 0.812
(0.023) (0.421) (0.016) (0.043) (0.010) (0.025) (0.050)
rt
-0.071 -0.053 -0.071 -0.085 -0.088 -0.050 -0.082
(0.002) (0.019) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004)
R-squares (R2) 0.598 0.747 0.683 0.772 0.870 0.821 0.737
the number of issues 679 53 478 55 262 239 238
deratioit
0.192 - 0.098 0.237 0.027 0.112 0.053
(0.002) - (0.002) (0.022) (0.001) (0.005) (0.009)
log ¾it
0.045 - 0.011 0.040 0.029 0.026 -0.016
Ultra- (0.011) - (0.009) (0.051) (0.006) (0.015) (0.030)
long
T it
-0.257 - -0.159 0.562 -0.411 0.001 0.097
(0.015) - (0.011) (0.080) (0.011) (0.030) (0.113)
rt
-0.108 - -0.101 -0.117 -0.097 -0.064 -0.085
(0.002) - (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.009)
R-squares (R2) 0.558 - 0.673 0.539 0.772 0.802 0.743
the number of issues 473 - 400 74 251 166 86
1. The results are based on instrumental variable estimation of equation (2) with ¯xed e®ects
during the period between April 1, 1997 and January 31, 2005. Instrumental variables include
constants, deratioit¡1, deratio
i
t¡2, log ¾
i
t, T
i
t , rt, and quarterly time dummy variables.
2. The number in a parenthesis is a robust standard error of a ¯xed e®ect estimate. The
reported standard error based on Arellano (1987) is robust with respect to cross-sectional
heteroskedasticity and within-issue serial correlation.
3. For estimation of speculative grades, the sample period between August 5, 2002 and Septem-
ber 20, 2002 is excluded, because bid/ask prices of speculative grades were not quoted by
corporate bond dealers at all, thereby credit spreads on speculative grades are missing be-
tween the two.
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Table 2: Regression of Credit Spreads on Debt-equity Ratios,
Historical Volatilities, Maturities, and Swap Rates
Full Period (April 1, 1997{January 31, 2005)
Maturities
Rating Groups
Independent
Investment-grade
Variables Investment- Speculative-
grade grade
A or Higher Aaa Aa A Baa
Short
deratioit
0.079 1.245 -0.004 -0.612 -0.037 0.006 0.071
(0.002) (0.024) (0.002) (0.088) (0.007) (0.002) (0.003)
log ¾it
0.029 0.243 0.018 0.104 0.004 0.028 0.032
(0.002) (0.019) (0.003) (0.024) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003)
T it
-0.082 0.110 -0.039 0.074 -0.050 -0.066 -0.134
(0.003) (0.014) (0.003) (0.012) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
rt
-0.141 -0.087 -0.185 -0.220 -0.188 -0.098 -0.096
(0.014) (0.038) (0.023) (0.085) (0.027) (0.012) (0.017)
R-squares (R2) 0.049 0.272 0.029 0.033 0.028 0.218 0.146
the number of issues 1352 396 750 110 422 344 718
Middle
deratioit
0.120 1.230 0.097 0.069 0.006 0.057 0.115
(0.001) (0.017) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
log ¾it
0.012 0.204 0.011 -0.003 0.001 0.011 0.017
(0.001) (0.010) (0.0004) (0.001) (0.0003) (0.001) (0.001)
T it
0.304 1.703 0.017 0.023 0.035 0.143 0.462
(0.007) (0.123) (0.004) (0.010) (0.003) (0.007) (0.013)
rt
-0.043 -0.107 -0.037 -0.009 -0.056 -0.049 -0.052
(0.002) (0.020) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
R-squares (R2) 0.462 0.433 0.684 0.808 0.822 0.796 0.545
the number of issues 1472 351 846 97 403 448 774
Long
deratioit
0.124 0.384 0.064 0.058 0.010 0.049 0.043
(0.002) (0.012) (0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
log ¾it
0.013 0.012 0.004 0.012 -0.003 0.005 0.001
(0.001) (0.012) (0.0004) (0.001) (0.0003) (0.001) (0.002)
T it
0.673 2.156 0.656 0.833 0.563 0.723 0.830
(0.024) (0.428) (0.016) (0.045) (0.010) (0.027) (0.050)
rt
-0.072 -0.067 -0.072 -0.087 -0.088 -0.051 -0.087
(0.002) (0.020) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004)
R-squares (R2) 0.601 0.747 0.685 0.776 0.873 0.816 0.742
the number of issues 679 53 478 55 262 239 238
deratioit
0.196 - 0.097 0.256 0.025 0.095 0.056
(0.002) - (0.002) (0.023) (0.001) (0.004) (0.009)
log ¾it
0.008 - 0.007 -0.012 -0.0003 0.015 0.007
Ultra- (0.001) - (0.0004) (0.003) (0.0003) (0.001) (0.004)
long
T it
-0.335 - -0.188 0.575 -0.427 0.064 0.292
(0.015) - (0.011) (0.085) (0.011) (0.028) (0.115)
rt
-0.108 - -0.102 -0.126 -0.098 -0.069 -0.093
(0.002) - (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.010)
R-squares (R2) 0.597 - 0.691 0.542 0.775 0.846 0.757
the number of issues 473 - 400 74 251 166 86
1. The results are based on instrumental variable estimation of equation (2) with ¯xed e®ects
during the period between April 1, 1997 and January 31, 2005. Instrumental variables include
constants, deratioit¡1, deratio
i
t¡2, log ¾
i
t, T
i
t , rt, and quarterly time dummy variables.
2. The number in a parenthesis is a robust standard error of a ¯xed e®ect estimate. The
reported standard error based on Arellano (1987) is robust with respect to cross-sectional
heteroskedasticity and within-issue serial correlation.
3. For estimation of speculative grades, the sample period between August 5, 2002 and Septem-
ber 20, 2002 is excluded, because bid/ask prices of speculative grades were not quoted by
corporate bond dealers at all, thereby credit spreads on speculative grades are missing be-
tween the two.
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Table 3: Relationship between Changes in Credit Spreads
and Firm Equity Returns
Full Period (April 1, 1997{January 31, 2005)
Maturities
Rating Groups
Independent
Investment-grade
Variables Investment- Speculative-
grade grade
A or Higher Aaa Aa A Baa
Short
retit
-0.018 -0.391 -0.048 -0.292 -0.116 -0.032 -0.017
(0.008) (0.033) (0.017) (0.220) (0.031) (0.007) (0.008)
rt ¡ rt¡20 -0.067 0.135 -0.114 -0.266 -0.122 -0.015 -0.022(0.023) (0.014) (0.040) (0.287) (0.051) (0.009) (0.018)
R-squares (R2) 0.006 0.050 0.010 0.016 0.010 0.028 0.007
the number of issues 1365 400 764 108 422 361 727
Middle
retit
-0.041 -0.177 -0.039 -0.033 -0.036 -0.048 -0.042
(0.002) (0.012) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
rt ¡ rt¡20 -0.026 0.029 -0.033 -0.019 -0.027 -0.043 -0.022(0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.019) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
R-squares (R2) 0.109 0.112 0.189 0.153 0.210 0.223 0.123
the number of issues 1422 342 823 94 388 446 756
Long
retit
-0.024 -0.116 -0.020 -0.193 -0.012 -0.023 -0.031
(0.001) (0.022) (0.002) (0.026) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
rt ¡ rt¡20 -0.050 0.002 -0.044 -0.080 -0.033 -0.049 -0.063(0.001) (0.010) (0.025) (0.026) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
R-squares (R2) 0.197 0.188 0.181 0.073 0.214 0.274 0.281
the number of issues 564 45 430 51 252 206 174
retit
-0.074 - -0.070 -0.441 -0.065 -0.067 -0.110
Ultra- (0.003) - (0.003) (0.017) (0.002) (0.058) (0.010)
long
rt ¡ rt¡20 -0.074 - -0.072 -0.121 -0.073 -0.063 -0.103(0.001) - (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004)
R-squares (R2) 0.177 - 0.186 0.224 0.194 0.248 0.272
the number of issues 239 - 218 46 155 104 35
1. The results are based on ¯xed e®ect estimation of equation (3) during the period between
April 1, 1997 and January 31, 2005.
2. The number in a parenthesis is a robust standard error of a ¯xed e®ect estimate. The
reported standard error based on Arellano (1987) is robust with respect to cross-sectional
heteroskedasticity and within-issue serial correlation.
3. For estimation of speculative grades, the sample period between August 5, 2002 and Septem-
ber 20, 2002 is excluded because bid/ask prices of speculative grades were not quoted by
corporate bond dealers at all.
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Table 4: E®ects of Changes in Rating on Changes in Credit Spreads
Full Period (April 1, 1997{January 31, 2005)
Maturities
Rating Changes
Rating
Rating Up Rating Down
Groups
+3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3 -5 -6 -10 -11
Short
Investment
-0.416 -0.014 -0.015 0.025 0.012 0.384 - - - -
(0.028) (0.003) (0.009) (0.006) (0.046) (0.122) - - - -
Speculative
-0.125 -0.005 -0.022 0.736 0.410 0.067 6.791 6.590 - -
(0.052) (0.005) (0.027) (0.028) (0.049) (0.185) (0.364) (0.354) - -
Middle
Investment
-0.643 -0.007 -0.010 0.021 0.075 0.038 - - - -
(0.015) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.020) - - - -
Speculative
- -0.081 -0.025 0.288 0.350 1.368 7.153 6.833 0.022 0.014
- (0.012) (0.015) (0.017) (0.031) (0.243) (0.248) (0.244) (0.005) (0.005)
Long
Investment
- -0.010 -0.002 0.001 0.035 0.040 - - - -
- (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.008) - - - -
Speculative
- - -0.025 0.052 0.117 3.110 5.272 5.299 - -
- - (0.006) (0.044) (0.010) (0.516) (0.558) (0.531) - -
Investment
- -0.027 -0.043 0.024 0.013 0.026 - - - -
Ultra- - (0.002) (0.009) (0.002) (0.004) (0.008) - - - -
long
Speculative
- - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - -
1. The results are based on ¯xed e®ect estimation of equation (3) during the period between
April 1, 1997 and January 31, 2005.
2. The number in a parenthesis is a robust standard error of a ¯xed e®ect estimate. The
reported standard error based on Arellano (1987) is robust with respect to cross-sectional
heteroskedasticity and within-issue serial correlation.
3. For estimation of speculative grades, the sample period between August 5, 2002 and Septem-
ber 20, 2002 is excluded because bid/ask prices of speculative grades were not quoted by
corporate bond dealers at all.
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Table 5: E®ects of Macroeconomic and Market Liquidity Factors on
Credit Spreads
Full Period (April 1, 1997{January 31, 2005)
Maturities
Independent Variables
Rating
Credit Risk Factors Macro Liquidity Factors
Groups
deratioit log ¾
i
t T
i
t rt Swapt CBvt JGBvt HPMt DIat
Short
Investment
0.063 0.051 -0.085 -0.119 0.207 -0.010 0.134 -0.057 -0.030
(0.002) (0.011) (0.003) (0.012) (0.042) (0.006) (0.014) (0.005) (0.001)
Speculative
1.167 0.338 0.098 -0.150 0.256 -0.707 -0.548 -0.045 -0.040
(0.021) (0.054) (0.014) (0.040) (0.080) (0.045) (0.060) (0.031) (0.004)
Middle
Investment
0.106 0.112 0.290 -0.051 0.190 -0.030 0.033 -0.002 -0.019
(0.001) (0.008) (0.007) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.0002)
Speculative
1.1143 0.109 1.786 -0.151 0.262 -0.293 -0.153 -0.018 -0.042
(0.016) (0.028) (0.123) (0.021) (0.056) (0.035) (0.043) (0.024) (0.003)
Long
Investment
0.106 0.014 0.559 -0.062 0.276 -0.017 0.054 -0.006 -0.018
(0.002) (0.009) (0.024) (0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.0003)
Speculative
0.308 0.076 0.067 0.017 0.262 -0.062 0.213 0.216 -0.063
(0.012) (0.028) (0.486) (0.023) (0.065) (0.054) (0.055) (0.035) (0.003)
Investment
0.192 0.048 -0.280 -0.104 0.363 -0.013 0.032 -0.050 -0.009
Ultra- (0.002) (0.011) (0.015) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.0003)
long
Speculative
- - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - -
1. The results are based on instrumental variable estimation of equation (4) with ¯xed e®ects
during the period between April 1, 1997 and January 31, 2005. Instrumental variables include
constants, deratioit¡1, deratio
i
t¡2, log ¾
i
t, T
i
t , rt, Swapt, CBvt, JGBvt, HPMt, DIat, and
quarterly time dummy variables.
2. The number in a parenthesis is a robust standard error of a ¯xed e®ect estimate. The
reported standard error based on Arellano (1987) is robust with respect to cross-sectional
heteroskedasticity and within-issue serial correlation.
3. For estimation of speculative grades, the sample period between August 5, 2002 and Septem-
ber 20, 2002 is excluded, because bid/ask prices of speculative grades were not quoted by
corporate bond dealers at all, thereby credit spreads on speculative grades are missing be-
tween the two.
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Figure 1. Credit Spreads and Equity Valuation: A-grade Bonds.
The ﬁgure plots the average credit spreads on corporate bonds rated as A by Moody’s, and the
average total equity valuation of corresponding issuing ﬁrms.
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Figure 2. Credit Spreads and Equity Valuation: Baa-grade Bonds.
The ﬁgure plots the average credit spreads on corporate bonds rated as Baa by Moody’s, and the
average total equity valuation of corresponding issuing ﬁrms.
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Figure 3. Market-wide Eﬀects for Investment-grade Bonds. The shaded area
represents 95% conﬁdence intervals of estimated coeﬃcients on quarterly time dummies (λt) of
equation (2).
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Figure 4. Market-wide Eﬀects for Speculative-grade Bonds. The shaded area
represents 95% conﬁdence intervals of estimated coeﬃcients on quarterly time dummies (λt) of
equation (2).
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Figure 5. Ten-year Swap Spread and Diﬀusion Index for Financial Position.
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Figure 6. High-powered Money, Velocity of Corporate Bond Market,
and Velocity of Japanese Government Bond Market.
Velocity measures for corporate bond market and for Japanese government bond market are deﬁned
by CBv = CBvt × 100 and JGBv = JGBvt × 10, respectively.
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